Saturday, August 17, 2024

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UKRAINES INCURSION IN RUSSIA - BY JACK WATLING.

Jack Watling, Senior Research Fellow - Land Warfare, Military Sciences, posits that Ukraine, fearing a not so unlikely scenario of a 2nd Trump Administration and what it implies for Ukraine per recent statements by Mr Trump - tying negotiations with Russia to end the war as a condition for further help - invaded a chunk of Russia in order to obtain a bargaining chip.





Personally, when the 'invasion' started on August 6, I only thought it was a raid as only elements of two brigades were involved. Primarily meant in the context of a psychological war, to give the Russians a taste of discomfort, the feeling that a supposedly far weaker adversary is, in the third year of the 'special operation', still capable not only of defending itself but even of attacking its foe on its own soil. I even thought that they were not going to hold on to their gains for long.

But in the meantime, at least 6 brigades are involved and it is indeed beginning to look like the Ukrainians plan to hold on to the conquered territory - something to bargain with if indeed a Trump Administration forces the two warring parties to the negotiation table. Per Mr Watlings column in The Guardian, Saturday August 17, 2024:


"Politically, the purpose of the operation is to build leverage ahead of possible negotiations. If Donald Trump wins the US presidency in November, the threat of withdrawing military-technical assistance is likely to force Kyiv to negotiate. The Ukrainian government wants to make sure that if it has to enter that process, it has things that Russia wants to trade for concessions. The Ukrainian military, therefore, must take and hold a sizeable chunk of Russian land for the duration of potential negotiations.

Another important element of the offensive is that Ukraine succeeded in maintaining operational security before launching the assault. This has been a significant problem with past Ukrainian operations, and the competence in the preparation and planning demonstrates lessons being learned from last year’s offensive that will encourage partners about the prospects for future operations.

It helped that Russian military intelligence appears to have suffered once again from a chronic lack of curiosity or imagination as Ukrainian forces were withdrawn from the line in Donbas.

So far Ukrainian forces in Kursk have been tactically successful. Undertrained Russian infantry have again performed poorly when lacking command and control, and confronted by a manoeuvring opponent without fixed points of reference. Surrendering Russian platoons are a symptom of the poor cohesion that exemplified the Russian collapse in Kharkiv in 2022.

While the Kursk operation is politically significant, a parallel series of Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian airfields is more militarily advantageous. Russian aircraft have been central to both the long-range strikes on Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure, and the glide bomb attacks on frontline positions that are inflicting heavy losses on Ukraine. Damaging planes is vital in reducing pressure on Ukraine’s defences.

There is a limit to how successful Ukraine can be. It was suffering from a shortage of troops to rotate and hold the line prior to its operation in Kursk. Now it has pulled together what was available as an operational reserve and committed it to a new axis. There is a limit to how far this force can push before it overextends, meaning it will need to dig in soon if the Ukrainians are to hold the ground until negotiations. But as soon as the front stops being dynamic, the Russians will dig defences and then bring up artillery, electronic warfare complexes and fresh troops. In the short term, the operation has diverted the weight of Russian air-delivered bombs away from Donbas, but this will be temporary. Russia has enough personnel and equipment to fight both fronts. It is less clear that this is true for Ukraine.

The military risks build with time. Having committed its operational reserve, Ukraine will struggle to plug gaps in the line, and it has not yet managed to resolve the threat posed by Russian reconnaissance drones, glide bombs, artillery, electronic warfare and operational-tactical missile complexes. Collectively these capabilities are allowing Russia to continue a steady advance to Pokrovsk, Toretsk and other towns in Donbas. These towns will soon be depopulated, and defending them will be resource-intensive...."




Also, don't miss these videos, per Rob Lee, to get an idea of what front operations look like:





One of the units involved is the 82nd Air Landing Brigade. Apparently the basic operational unit in the UA Army is the brigade. Nowhere have I seen divisions mentioned.





Good night.



MFBB.
Geplaatst door op 6:43:00 PM

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